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Abstract 
By discussing several examples, the theory 
of generalized functional models is shown to 
be very natural for modeling some situations 
of reasoning under uncertainty. A general­
ized functional model is a pair (f, P) where 
f is a function describing the interactions 
between a parameter variable, an observa­
tion variable and a random source, and P 
is a probability distribution for the random 
source. Unlike traditional functional mod­
els, generalized functional models do not re­
quire that there is only one value of the pa­
rameter variable that is compatible with an 
observation and a realization of the random 
source. As a consequence, the results of the 
analysis of a generalized functional model are 
not expressed in terms of probability distri­
butions but rather by support and plausi­
bility functions. The analysis of a general­
ized functional model is very logical and is 
inspired from ideas already put forward by 
R.A. Fisher in his theory of fiducial proba­
bility. 
1 The Theories of Bayes and Fisher 
Jessica is a young woman suspecting that she might be 
pregnant. To find out about her status she decides to 
go to the local pharmacy and buys a pregnancy test. 
The test result indicates that she is not pregnant, but 
she knows that such tests are not fully trustworthy. 
The question is then how to evaluate the chance that 
she is pregnant in spite of the negative test result. 
Of course, one possibility is to use the Bayesian the­
ory to analyze the situation. The Bayesian model is 
as follows. Let 8 denote the variable indicating her 
true pregnancy status. The set of possible values of 
B is e = { -1, +1} where -1 means that she is not 
pregnant and +1 means that she is pregnant. Simi­
larly, Jet � denote the variable indicating a test result. 
The set of possible values of� is X = { - 1 ,  + 1} where 
-1 represents a negative test result and + 1 a positive 
test result. The reliability of the test can be expressed 
by two numbers, namely the chance p that the test 
will indicate a negative result when a woman in not 
pregnant, and the chance p' that the test will indi­
cate a positive result when a woman is pregnant. It 
is reasonable to assume that both p and p' are rather 
high. This information is represented by the condi­
tional probabilities 
P(� =- liB = -1) 
= 
p, P(� = liB = 1} = p'. (1) 
Suppose that Jessica's prior about her status is given 
by the probabilities 
P(B 
= -1) = y, P(B = +1) = 1- y. (2) 
Then by Bayes theorem the posterior probability that 
Jessica is not pregnant is 
P'(B = -1) = yp . (3) yp+ (1- y)(l- p') 
According to the Bayesian theory, this represents Jes­
sica's degree of confidence in the fact that she is not 
pregnant. 
Now assume that the probability of getting a correct 
negative result is the same as getting a correct positive 
result, i.e. p = p'. This means that the test reveals 
the true pregnancy status with probability p. This 
probability is an indicator of the confidence in the test 
result. Then by formula (3) the posterior probability 
that .Jessica is not pregnant is 
P'(B = - 1) = yp (4) yp+ (1 - y)( l - p) 
This is the Bayesian solution to Jessica's pregnancy 
test problem. However, .Jessica is unable to give the 
prior probability of her being pregnant because she 
is not comfortable with the idea of giving a precise 
number to estimate this chance. As can be seen in for­
mula ( 4), without a prior it is impossible to find the 
posterior probability of her not being pregnant. The 
Bayesian theory requires prior probabilities to com­
pute posterior probabilities. But Jessica is still in­
terested in finding a numerical value expressing the 
chance of her not being pregnant considering the neg­
ative test result. How can we find such a numerical 
value? In 1930, R.A. Fisher identified a class of prob­
lems in which it appeared to him that inductive prob­
ability statements could legitimately be made without 
prior probabilities being used. It turns out that Jes­
sica's problem when p = p' is one of them. In this 
example, Fisher's reasoning would go as follows. First 
define the variable 
w=B·�- (5) 
The distribution of w is independent of B as the fol­
lowing development shows. First we have 
P(w = 1) P(w =liB= -l)P(B = -1) 
+P(w =liB= l)P(B = 1). (6) 
But by equation (5) if B = -1 then w = -� and if 
e = 1 then w = �. Therefore 
P(w = 1) P( -� = l iB = -l)P(B = -1) 
+P(� =liB= l)P(B = 1) 
p 
· P(B = -1) + p · P(B = 1) 
p (7) 
and similarly P(w = -1) = 1- p. Fisher called such 
a variable w a pivotal quantity or a pivot. Generally 
speaking, a pivotal quantity is a function of 8 and � 
whose distribution is independent of B. The obser­
vation { = -1 Jessica makes doesn't permit her to 
infer some information on w because both w ::::: + 1 
and w = -1 are compatible with the observation (see 
equation (5)). So after observing�= -1 we still have 
P(w = 1) = p and P(w = -1) = 1 - p. These 
probability statements are as valid as before observ­
ing E = -1. The distribution of w can be seen as 
a feature of the test device: P(w = 1) = p means 
that the probability of getting a correct test result is 
p because w = 1 when e and E indicate the same preg­
nancy status. Under the assumption that w = l, the 
observation E = -1 logically implies that e = -1 since 
w = 8 · (. Since the assumption that w = 1 is true 
with probability p, it follows that this probability can 
be transfered to its logical consequence 8 = -1, i.e. 
P(B = -1) = p. In a similar way, it can be derived 
that P(B = 1) = 1 - p. This argumentation is an 
instance of Fisher's fiducial theory. The probabilities 
P(B = 1) = 1- p and P(B = -1) = p represent the so­
called fiducial distribution of B. Fisher noticed that the 
fiducial distribution coincides with the Bayesian pos­
terior if a uniform prior distribution is assumed for the 
variable B, but Jessica doesn't have any prior ( not even 
the uniform one) and so the statement P(B = -1) = p 
cannot be justified by Bayes' theorem. 
There are situations where an observation does pro­
vide information about a pivotal quantity w = g(B, �)­
This information is represented by the set f1' of all 
w E f1 that are compatible with the observation. The 
elements in n - n' are impossible in view of the ob­
servation. This information is taken into account by 
conditioning the initial distribution of w on the set 
f1'. This idea of conditioning the distribution of the 
pivot is also present in Fisher's fiducial theory. In the 
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fiducial theory, using the pivot w = g(B, () and the ob­
servation� = x, every element o E f1' logically implies 
that 8 = t for some t E 0. If P' denotes the con­
ditional distribution of w given n'' then the fiducial 
probability oft is given by the probability of all o E f1' 
that logically imply B = t, i.e. 
Pjid(t) = L {P'(o) : 0 En', 0 implies t}. 
2 Generalized Functional Models 
(8) 
In this section we consider models where the spirit and 
the logic of Fisher's fiducial argument can be applied. 
However, the theory presented here is not the fiducial 
theory itself. Within the fiducial theory, the reasoning 
starts with two variables: the parameter variable 8 
and the observation variable �- Then one tries to find 
a pivotal quantity w = g(B, 0 from which the fiducial 
distribution of e is determined using the observation. 
In generalized functional models we start from three 
variables: the parameter and observation variables B 
and w plus a third variable w. The variable w is a 
random variable whose distribution P is known and 
assumed to be independent of B. This is a major dif­
ference with the fiducial theory because the fiducial 
theory requires finding a function of 8 and { whose 
distribution can be determined and proved to be inde­
pendent of B. In the fiducial theory, conditional dis­
tributions form the initial knowledge before the obser­
vations are made. However, in generalized functional 
models the initial knowledge is not given by such con­
ditional distributions, but rather by the distribution of 
w assumed to be independent of B, and by a function 
of the variables e and w to be described below. 
Now generalized functional models are precisely de­
fined. Let !1 denote the set of all possible values of the 
variable w and as usual let 8 and X denote the set of 
possible values of e and � respectively. It is assumed 
that there is exactly one correct but unknown value of 
8. Let t' be this value. The problem is to generate 
knowledge about t* in the light of the available infor­
mation. The interaction between the three variables 
w, � and e is represented by a function 
f:0xf1---tX (9) 
that is determined from the situation under investiga­
tion (see the examples in section 4). The value j(t, o) 
specifies what would necessarily be observed if t was 
the correct parameter value and o was the outcome 
of the random variable w. It is important to remark 
that the function f is completely determined from the 
logic of the situation under investigation. Thus a gen­
eralized functional model is a pair (f, P) where f is a 
function as in ( 9) and P is a known probability distri­
bution on n that is independent of B. 
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This figure shows that f describes a relation between 
the variables w, 8, �and Pis a probability distribution 
on !!. In a generalized functional model (!, P), sup­
pose that the value of the variable � is observed to be 
x, i.e. � = x. For the time being, assume that this 
observation is completely compatible with all possible 
values of w, i.e. 
{o E!!: 3 t E 8 such that j(t,o) = x} = !!. (10) 
This means that the observation x could have been 
generated by any value o E !!. In such a situation 
it is natural to consider that the distribution P of w 
remains the same after observing x. The same idea is 
present in the fiducial theory. Under the assumption 
that the outcome of the random variable w was a, the 
observation x logically implies that the correct value 
of () must be in the set 
fx(o) = {t E 8 : f(t,o) = x} . (11) 
So the value o is an argument in favor of the hypothesis 
that t* is in r x (w) because if 0 was the outcome then 
the hypothesis would necessarily be true. Since o was 
the outcome of w with probability P(o), it follows that 
o supports the hypothesis that t• E f x(o) to the degree 
P(o). This reasoning is essentially the same as the one 
used to define the fiducial distribution of() when an ob­
servation is made. However, in the fiducial theory and 
in the functional models traditionally considered, the 
sets r x ( o) are always assumed to be singletons, which 
is not necessarily the case in this paper (see sections 3 
and 4 below). This is why the functional models con­
sidered in this paper are called generalized functional 
models and not simply functional models. Classical, 
non-generalized, functional models have been studied 
by Fraser [3], Bunke [1], Plante [5] and Dawid, Stone 
[2]. See also Shafer [7]. 
Now consider the case where the observation x does 
provide some knowledge about w. This happens when 
the set 
V:c(!!) = {a E!!: 3 t E 8 such that j(t,o) = x} (12) 
is different from !!. Only the elements of vx (!!) are 
possible values for the outcome of the random vari­
able w in view of the observation x. So the initial 
probability distribution P of w must be conditioned 
on Vx (!!). This defines a new probability measure P' 
on vx (D) . Under the assumption that o E vx(!!) was 
the outcome of w, the observation x implies that t* is 
in the set 
fx(o) = {t E 8 :  j(t,o) = x} . (13) 
Since o was the outcome of w with probability P'(o), 
it follows that o in Vx (!!) supports the hypothesis that 
t• is in fx(o) to the degree P'(o). Remark that fx(o) 
is not empty for all o E vx(!!). 
3 Generalized Functional Models and 
Hints 
The goal of this section is to show how the knowledge 
about e generated by the observations in a general­
ized functional model can be expressed with the the­
ory of hints, which is a theory strongly related to the 
Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence [4], [6]. From a 
generalized functional model (!, P), an observation x 
generates the set vx (!!) of values of w that are compat­
ible with x. This knowledge is used to condition the 
probability measure P on vx(D) and let P' denote the 
resulting probability measure. Using the functional re­
lation f and the observation x, each possible outcome 
o E Vx (!!) logically implies that t* is in the subset 
r X ( 0) of e. This defines the mapping 
fx: Vx(O)-+ 28. (14) 
Since o is the outcome of the random variable w with 
probability P'(o), it follows that o supports the hy­
pothesis that t* E r x(o) to the degree P'(o). Putting 
things together, the observation x and the generalized 
functional model (!, P) define the object 
1t(x) = (vx(O),P',r,,e) (15) 
which is called a hint. It represents the knowledge 
about ()generated by the observation x. A hint 'H(x) 
generates two functions called the support and plausi­
bility functions. The support function is constructed 
as follows. For an arbitrary subset H � 8 ,  consider 
the hypothesis that t* is in H. This hypothesis is ei­
ther true or false, but to what extend is it supported 
by the hint 1-l(x) ? If the outcome of w is in the set 
Ux(H) = {o E Vx(O): r,(o) � H}, (16) 
then the hypothesis t* E H is definitely true because 
if the outcome is an element o in Ux (H) then t* E 
fx(o) and f,(o) � H, which implies that t* E H. 
Since the outcome of w is in ux(!!) with probability 
P'(ux(H)), it is natural to call this probability the 
degree of support of the hypothesis t* E H (in the rest 
of the paper, such a hypothesis will simply be denoted 
by H). The degree of support of the hypothesis H is 
written sp(H), i.e. 
sp(H) = P'(u,(H)). (17) 
The corresponding function sp: 28 -+ [0, 1] is called a 
support function. 
It is also interesting to look at the degre of compati­
bility of the hypothesis H with the knowledge about e 
represented by the hint 'H(x). An element o E v,(O) 
is compatible with the hypothesis H if it is possible 
that o is the outcome of w and at the same time H is 
true. But this is the case when r x(a) n H f. 0. So 
Vx(H) = {o E Vx(!!): fx(o) n H f. 0} (18) 
is the set of elements that are compatible with the 
hypothesis H. Since the probability that the outcome 
of w is compatible with H is P' ( Vx (H)), it is natural to 
define this probability as the degree of compatibility, 
or the degree of plausibility, of the the hypothesis H. 
It is written pl(H), i.e. 
pl(H) = P'(vx(H)). (19) 
This can be done for all subsets H � 9 and the cor­
responding function pl : 26 -+ [0, 1] is called a plausi­
bility function. Elementary properties of support and 
plausibility functions are listed below: 
1. sp(0) = 0, sp(B) = 1 
2. pl(0) 
= 
0, pl(B) = 1 
3. For all H <; 9, pl(H) = 1 - sp(Hc), sp(H) < 
pl(H) 
4. If H <; H', then sp(H) ::; sp(H') and pl(H) < 
pl(H') 
5. Let H; c e, i = 1, ... , n be a collection of subsets 
of 9. If we define S = {I � {1, ... , n} : I ::f; 0} 
then 
sp(Uf=1H;) � L {(-1)1'1+'sp(niEJHi): IE S}. 
Property 5 shows that general support functions are 
not additive measures, e.g. sp(H) + sp(Hc) :S 1. Re­
mark also that the inequality of property 5 would be 
transformed into an equality if sp was replaced by a 
probability measure. For simplicity, the abbreviations 
sp(t) and pl(t) will be used instead of sp({t}) and 
pl({t}). 
Support functions are known as belief functions in the 
Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence [6]. A function 
Bel : 28 -+ [0, 1] (20) 
is a belief function if there exists a function m : 28 -+ 
[0, 1] satisfying 
m(0) 
L {m(X):X<;B} 
and such that 
0 
1 (21) 
Bel(H) = L { m(X) : X � H} (22) 
for all H c 9. The support function sp associated 
with the hint H(x) is a belief function whose corre­
sponding m function is given by 
m(X) = L {P'(o) : r x(o) =X}. (23) 
There is a special kind of hints called precise hints. A 
hint 1{ (X) iS Called preciSe When f x ( 0) iS a Singleton 
for all elements o E vx(fl). For precise hints, the cor­
responding support and plausibility functions coincide 
and they are probability measures, i.e. sp(H) = pl(H) 
for all H � e and sp is a probability measure on 8: 
sp(H) = L {sp(t): t E H} (24) 
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for all H <; e. Property (24) holds for precise hints 
but does not hold in general (see property 5 above). 
So far we have considered the case where there is only 
one observation from which inferences about () is made. 
Now consider a second observation x' resulting from 
another realization of the random variable w. We con­
sider it as the outcome of the random variable w' and 
we assume that w and w' are independent and iden­
tically distributed random variables before any obser­
vation is made. Let (' denote the observation variable 
associated with w'. Of course the set of possible val­
ues of ( and w' are still X and fl and the function 
f : e X n -+ X is still valid when x' is observed. In 
the same way as the observation x generated the hint 
H(x), the observation x' generates the hint 
H(x') = (vx•(fl),P",fx•,B) (25) 
where P" is the conditional probability of P given 
Vx•(fi). Then the question is: what can be infered 
about e given the hints H(x) and H(x') derived from 
the observations x and x' ? 
Under the assumption that the outcome of (w, w') was 
(o,o'), the observations x and x' imply that t• E fx(o) 
and C E fx·(o') and hence t• E rx(o)nfx•(o'). There­
fore, a pair (o,o') such that fx(o) nrx•(o') = 0 is cer­
tainly not the outcome of (w, w' ) . So, in view of the 
observations x and x', the set of possible outcomes of 
(w,w') is 
fix x' = { (o, o') E Vx(fi) X Vx•(fi) : r x(o)nf x' (o') ::j; 0}. ' 
(26) 
So the probability measure P' P" must be conditioned 
on fix,x', which leads to the new probability space 
(flx,x', Pc,x' ). The probability Px,x' (a, o') expresses 
the chance that the outcome of (w, w') was (o, o') after 





for all ( o, o') E flx ,x' . From this hint degrees of support 
and plausibility can be computed for any hypothesis 
H c e we are interested in. This is done in the same 
way as with the hint H(x). For example, the degree of 
support of H <; 8 is 
where 
SPx,x•(H) = Px,x•(Ux.x(H)) (29) 
Ux,x • (H) = { (o,o') E Dx,x': fx,x•(o,o') � H}. (30) 
This way to combine two hints into a new hint is called 
Dempster's rule of combination. As we have seen, this 
rule is very logical and is an essential element of the 
theory of hints and belief functions. Two hints having 
the same support function are called equivalent. If EB 
denotes the combination operator, i.e. 
H(x, x') = H(x) EB H(x'), (31) 
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then it can be proved that EB is commutative and as­
sociative up to equivalence. This allows us to speak of 
the combination of more than two hints. 
When there is a sequence of observations Xt, ... , Xn 
in a generalized functional model (f, P), the infered 
knowledge about () is represented by the combined hint 
1i(x1, . .. , Xn) = EBf�t'h'(x;). (32) 
This hint can then be used to determine degrees of 
support and plausibility of hypotheses of interest in 
the usual way. Note that the actual computation of 
such degrees of support and plausibility can be facil­
itated by using special computational procedures in­
volving the so-called commonality functions (for more 
information on this topic, see [4] or [6]). 
4 Examples 
4.1 Jessica's Pregnancy Test 
Jessica's pregnancy test problem can be analyzed from 
a functional model perspective. Indeed, from w = () · �, 
it follows that () · w = �, which defines the function 
f : e X n � X. Actually, the relations w = () . � 
and () · w = � are mathematically equivalent, both ex­
pressing the fact that the test device is trustworthy 
(i.e. w = + 1) when the observed test result (i.e. the 
value of �) is the same as the actual pregnancy status 
(i.e. the value of 8). If it is assumed that the test 
result is a correct indicator with probability 0.9 and 
a wrong indicator with probability 0.1, then it follows 
that P(w = +1) = 0.9 and P(w = -1) = 0.1 because 
w = +1 implies � = e (the test result is a correct in­
dicator) and w = -1 implies � = -e (the test result 
is a wrong indicator). Remark that in the functional 
model these two probabilities are part of the initial 
knowledge about the problem, they are not derived 
from known conditional probabilities as in the fidu­
cial theory. Since Jessica's test result is negative, i.e 
� = -1, it follows that V-t (O) =nand 
r_t(1)={-1}, r_l(-1)={1}, (33) 
which defines the hint 
H( -1) = (11, P, r -t, 0). (34) 
This is a precise hint and therefore the associated sup­
port function is a regular probability distribution given 
by 
sp( -1) = 0.9, sp(1) = 0.1. (35) 
So the degree of support that Jessica is pregnant is 
0.1 and the degree of support that she is not is 0.9. 
This is a reasonable result because the reliability of 
the test device is 0.9 and the test says that Jessica is 
not pregnant. 
In general, if P(w = 1) = p and the test is repeated 
n times, let k denote the number of positive results 
and n - k the number of negative results. It can be 
shown that the hint resulting from the combination of 
then hints associated with then observations is again 
a precise hint whose support function is given by 
sp( -1) = 
sp( +1) 
pk(1 _ p)n-k + (1 _ p)kpn-k 
pk(1 _ p)n-k 
4.2 Policy Identification (I) 
(36) 
In this example, the following real-world situation is 
considered. Peter is in room A and has a regular coin 
in front of him. He flips the coin and observes what 
shows up: either H or T. Then he decides between the 
following two policies: either tell Paul, who is in room 
B, what actually showed up on the coin (policy 1) or 
tell him that the coin showed heads up, regardless of 
what actually showed up (policy 2). Of course, Paul 
is unaware of the policy that Peter has chosen. Peter 
flips the coin n times in total and each time reports to 
Paul what the chosen policy dictates to tell him. Paul 
knows that Peter is using the same policy each time 
the coin is flipped. From the sequence of heads and 
possibly tails that he receives from Peter, Paul wants 
to infer information about what policy Peter is using, 
is it policy 1 or policy 2 ? 
To answer this question, Paul builds a generalized 
functional model of the situation. The parameter 
space is 0 = { t1, t2} where t1 means, say, that Peter 
is using policy 1 and t2 that he is using policy 2. The 
observation space is X = {H, T} (the set of possible 
reports to Paul after one flip of the coin) and the sam­
ple Space of W is 0 = { Ot, 02} Where 01 means, say, that 
heads shows up when the coin is flipped and o2 means 
that tails shows up when the coin is flipped. Since the 
coin is a regular one, we have P(ol) 
= 
P(o2) = 0.5. 
What is the function f : e X 0 � X in this case ? 
Let's start with f ( t1, o1). It is clear that under policy 
1, if heads shows up then Peter will report H to Paul, 
which means that f(t1,oi) =H. It can easily be seen 
that the function f is given by 
f(tt,od = H, 
!(t2,ot) = H, 
f(tl, o2) = T 
f(tz, o2) = H .  (37) 
First let's analyse the situation when only one value 
is reported to Paul. If H is reported, then the infor­
mation that can be infered on () is represented by the 
hint 
where 
'H(H) = (O,P,rH,0) (38) 
rH(oz) = {t2}, fH(ot) = 0. (39) 
It is important to remark that this hint is not a pre­
cise hint because r H ( oi) is not a singleton. Indeed, 
r H (at) = 0 because if H is reported and the coin 
shows heads up then Peter could have used either pol­
icy 1 or policy 2. On the other hand, r H ( 02 ) 
= 
{ tz} 
because if H is reported and the coin shows tails up 
then Peter is necessarily using policy 2. The hypoth­
esis that Peter is using policy 2 is supported with 
strength P(o2) = 0.5 by the observation H, whereas 
there is not support in favor of the fact that Peter 
is using policy 1. So the support function associated 
with 1i(H) is given by 
SPH(tl) = 0, SPH(t2) = 0.5. (40) 
Since 7-l(H) is not precise, this support function is 
not a regular probability measure on 8: spH(ti) + 
SPH (t2) < 1. The plausibility function associated with 
H(H) is given by 
plH(ti) = 0.5, plH(t2) = 1. (41) 
This means that the degree of compatibility of the hy­
pothesis that Peter is using policy 1 with the observa­
tion H is 0.5, whereas nothing is speaking against the 
hypothesis that he is using policy 2, it is fully compat­
ible with the observation H. 
If Tis reported, then vr(D) = {o2} because o1 is ex­
cluded since it is impossible to observe T if the coin 
turned heads up. This implies that we have to con­
dition P on { 02}, which results in the deterministic 
probability measure P'(o2) = 1. Since rr(o2) = {ti}, 
which means that if Tis reported and the coin turned 
tails then Peter is using policy 1, it follows that the 
hint derived from the observation T is 
H(T) = ({o2},P',rr,8). ( 42) 
Then the corresponding support function is 
spr(ti) = 1, spr(t2) = 0, (43) 
which means that Peter is definitely using policy 1. 
The hint 1i(T) is called a deterministic hint on t1 be­
cause it is certain that h is the correct value of the 
parameter variable e. 
Now let's analyze the situation where n reports are 
made. Let k denote the number of heads reports and 
n- k the number of tails reports (the order in which 
the heads and tails are reported is irrelevant). The 
hint on e that can be derived from this collection of 
observations is 
H(n, k) = (EB�11i(H)) EB (EB?�1k1i(T)). (44) 
If at least one tails is reported (i.e. n- k > 0), then it 
can easily be proved that H(n, k) is again a determin­
istic hint on t1, which means that Peter is using policy 
1. This is reasonable because if at least one tails is 
reported then Peter can't be using policy 2. If no tails 
is reported, then it can be proved that 7-l(n, n) is not 
precise and its support function is given by 
sp(ti) = 0, sp(t2) = 1- 0.5n. (45) 
Note that sp(ti) + sp(t2) < 1 because 1-i(n, n) is not 
precise. The corresponding plausibility function is 
pl(t i) = 0.5n, pl(t2) = 1. (46) 
So the hypothesis t1 is becoming less and less plausible 
as the number of heads reported increases, which is of 
course very reasonable. 
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4.3 Policy Identification (II} 
In this example we consider the following real-world 
situation. Peter is in room A and has two coins in 
front of him, one red and one blue. Peter tells Paul, 
who is in room B, that when the red coin is flipped, 
the probability that heads shows up is p1 and when the 
blue coin is flipped, the probability that heads shows 
up is pz. Peter successively flips the red and blue coins 
and observes what shows up : either H or T for each 
coin. Then he decides between the following two poli­
cies: either tell Paul what showed up on the red coin 
(policy 1) or tell him what showed up on the blue coin 
(policy 2). After the policy is chosen, he informs Paul 
about what showed up on the coin specified by the 
policy. Of course, Paul is unaware of the policy that 
Peter is using. This experiment is repeated n times in 
total, thereby assuming that the policy Peter is using 
remains the same throughout all experiments. From 
the sequence of heads and tails that he receives from 
Peter, Paul wants to infer information about which 
policy Peter is using, policy 1 or policy 2 ? 
To answer this question, Paul builds a generalized 
functional model of the situation. The parameter 
space is 0 = { t1, tz} where t1 means, say, that Peter 
is using policy 1 and t2 that he is using policy 2. The 
observation space is X= {H, T}. The sample space is 
constructed from the two random variables involved in 
the experiment, namely the result of flipping the red 
coin (random variable w) and the result of flipping the 
blue coin (random variable w') .  The sample space of w 
is 0 = {OJ 1 02} where OJ means that the red coin ShOWS 
heads up and o2 that it shows tails up. By analogy, we 
define the sample space 0' = { o�, o2} of the random 
variable w'. The sample space of (w, w') is then 0 X 0' 
and the corresponding probabilities are 
P(o1,o�) P1P2 
P(o1,o�) pi(1- pz ) 
P(oz,o�) = (1-pl)pz 
P(oz,o�) = (1- pi)(l- pz). (47) 
What is the function f : e X 0 X 0' --+ X in this case 
? Let's start with f ( t1, 01, oD. It is clear that under 
policy 1, if the red coin shows heads up then Peter will 
report H to Paul, which implies that j(t1, o1, o�) = H 
and f(ti,oi,o2) =H. It can easily be seen that the 
complete function f is given by 
f(t1,o1,o�) = H, f(t1,o1,o;) = H 
f(tl,oz,o�) = T, f(ti,o2,o;) = T 
f(t2,o!,oD = H, j(tz,o1,o;) = T 
f(t2,oz,oD = H, f(tz,oz,o�) = T. (48) 
If H is reported, then 
vH(O x O') = {(o1,o;), (o1,o�), (o2,o;)} (49) 
and the conditional distribution of P on vH(O x 0') is 
the probability P' given by 
PI+ P2- P1P2 
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Also, we have 
f H ( ( 01 , 0�)) 
fH((ol,o�)) 
r H ( ( o2 , o�)) 
which shows that the hint 
PI(l-p2) 
PI + P2 - PIP2 
(1-pi)Pz 
PI+ P2- PIP2 




is not a precise hint. Its corresponding support func­
tion is given by 
SPH(ti) = PI(l-p2) PI+ P2- PIP2 
SPH(t2) = (1-pl)P2 PI + P2- PIP2 (53) 
On the other hand, if T is reported, then 
vr(O x 0') = {(o1, o�), (o2, o� ),(o2, o�)} (54) 
and the conditional distribution of P on vr(O x 0') is 
the probability P' given by 
P' ( ( o2, o�)) 
Also, we have 
r r ( ( o1 , o�)) 
fr((o2,o�)) 
fr((o2,o;)) 
which shows that the hint 
P1(l-p2) 
1 - PIP2 
(1- PdP2 
1- PIP2 
(1- PI)(l- P2) 






1-I.(T) = (vr(O X 0'), P', rr, e) (57) 
is again not a precise hint. Its corresponding support 
function is given by 
(1- PI)Pz 
1- PIP2 
PI (1- P2) 
1- P1P2 . (58) 
Now let's analyse the situation where n reports are 
made, k of which beeing H and n - k being T (here 
again the order in which the heads and tails are re­
ported is irrelevant). Then the hint on () induced by 
the collection of observations is 
It can be proved that this hint is not precise and its 
associated support function is given by 
sp( tl) 
where 
p�(l-pi)n-k- (PIPz)k((l-pi)(l- P2))n-k 
p;(l- P2)n-k- (PIPz)k((l-pi)(l- P2)r-k 
D p�(l _ pi)n- k + p�(l- P'2)n-k 
-(PIP2)k((l-pi)(l- P2))n-k. 
5 Prior Information in Functional 
Models 
In a situation where the initial knowledge contains a 
prior probability distribution P0 on B, it is easy to 
include this information into a generalized functional 
model (f, P). Indeed, this prior information can be 
viewed as a precise hint on () given by 
1-l.o = (e, Po, r, e) (60) 
where f(t) = {t} for all () E e. The support and 
plausibility functions of this hint is nothing but the 
prior probability distribution P0. Then this hint 1-1.0 is 
combined with the hint 'H(x1, .. . , xn) by Dempster's 
rule of combination to obtain a new hint 1-1. expressing 
the knowledge about () derived from all the available 
information about the problem under investigation: 
1-1. = 1-l.o ffi 'H(xi, . . . , Xn)· (61) 
Then, as usual, degrees of support and plausibility can 
be determined from H. It turns out that 'H is always 
a precise hint. 
On the other hand, from a generalized functional 
model (f, P) the following conditional distributions of 
� can be defined: 
Pr(� = xiB = t) = P({o E 0: f(t,o) = x}) (62) 
for all t E e. Such conditional probability distri­
butions specify what is called a distribution model. 
These conditional distributions together with a prior 
probability P on () completely specifies a Bayesian 
model which is denoted by (Pr, P). Then it can be 
proved that if P0 = P, then the support function as­
sociated with 1-1. (which is a probability measure since 
1-1. is precise) coincides with posterior distribution of() 
given XJ, . . . , Xn in the Bayesian model (Pr, P). In ad­
dition, if 'H (xi, ... , xn ) happens to be precise, then its 
associated support function coincides with the poste­
rior distribution of() given XI, ... , Xn in the Bayesian 
model (Pr, pu) where pu is the uniform distribution 
on e. 
Finally, let's mention that it is possible to find two 
different generalized functional models (h, P1) and 
(h, P2) having the same associated distribution model 
Pr(� = xiB = t). This means that generalized func­
tional models have a stronger ability to distinguish be­
tween real-world situations than distribution models, 
which is an important good quality of generalized func­
tional models. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper shows that generalized functional models 
are very natural in some situations of reasoning un­
der uncertainty. The advantage of this type of models 
is that they are capable of better representing the in­
formation that is really available at the begining of 
the analysis. For example, there is no need to arti­
ficially create prior information on the variable of in­
terest if originally there is none. But if some is avail­
able, then it can easily be included into a generalized 
functional model. The analysis of generalized func­
tional models is inspired from ideas already advocated 
by R.A. Fisher in his theory of fiducial probability. 
This analysis naturally leads to the use of support and 
plausibility functions to express the knowledge about 
the variable of interest that is generated by the avail­
able information. These functions, and not necessarily 
probability distributions, are the appropriate tools to 
represent the results of the analysis of a generalized 
functional model. 
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